We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightlybinding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high-reservation wage workers into the minimum-wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly-binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.
INTRODUCTION
Milton Friedman (1976, pp. 189-193) and many others have noted that a minimum wage may increase employment and efficiency when all labor is hired by a monopsony. Thus, it is well known that a minimum wage in the presence of one type of market distortion can be efficiency enhancing. In this paper, we present another example. Drawing on Chilean institutions, we argue that when wages are taxed, a slightly binding minimum wage covering only part of the labor market will draw new workers into the labor market, attracted by the higher wage. The initially-employed workers displaced by the minimum wage drive down the wage in the uncovered sector. If the labor demand elasticity is higher there, than in the minimum-wage sector, many will find employment there, and the minimum wage will raise total employment. If labor services are taxed and leisure is not, this will enhance efficiency. Just as in the monopsony case, an initial distortion means we have too little employment to begin with, and the minimum wage may mitigate the effect of that distortion. Both of these mechanisms are examples of the general theory of the second best.
In this paper we model the interaction between minimum wages and taxes to find the precise conditions for a slightly binding minimum wage to be efficiency enhancing and to measure the efficiency gain. This leads us to a discussion of how a policy maker may wish to use a minimum wage along with taxes on labor services to achieve the best possible mix of employment, economic efficiency and tax revenue. A succinct summary of the paper is provided by the six propositions scattered through it and the two closing sections.
Workers prefer jobs in the "protected" sector but accept jobs in the "free" sector so long as the free sector wage exceeds their reservation price. As the Edwards' model the labor market, all workers with reservation wages below the "protected" wage, including those employed in the free sector, search for employment in the protected sector. A worker does not have to be unemployed to search for a better job, so the minimum wage does not contribute directly to unemployment.
The Edwards also note (p.151):
Traditionally social security taxes had been very high, introducing important distortions in the labor market. In 1974, for example, total taxes on blue-collar workers, as a proportion of net wages, amounted to 56.9 percent.
The Edwards' characterization of the Chilean labor market is what Gang and Tower (1990) , GT, refer to as an employment lottery (the on-the-job-search or Welch, 1974, case) .
1 GT is a version of the paper without the taxation of labor earnings. It finds that with the lottery, imposition of a minimum wage in one sector may raise aggregate employment. Like the Edwards, GT characterize those with a reservation wage between the protected wage and the free wage who are not employed in the protected sector as unemployed. GT also find that in spite of the possibility that the minimum wage will raise employment, it will always reduce economic welfare once the value of leisure is accounted for.
Next we ask in the context of the Edwards' model: What is the condition for an increase in the minimum wage, starting from the free level to raise employment? Then we ask: If labor services are taxed, what is the condition for an increase in the minimum wage to raise economic efficiency?
HOW THE MINIMUM WAGE AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT
Our economy is a small open one, which consists of two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture. Labor and a fixed stock of capital produce manufactures. Labor and a fixed stock of land produce agriculture. Both goods are traded freely at fixed world prices, and the exchange rate is fixed. This fixes prices to consumers so real and nominal wages are identical. Labor is perfectly mobile between the two sectors. Manufacturing is covered by a minimum wage, which is non-binding initially. The wage in agriculture is free. The supply of labor is upward sloping, with workers preferring employment in the high wage sector. "0" superscripts denote initial values. Initially the disposable (after-tax) wage in the covered sector equals the disposable wage in the uncovered sector:
(1)
All employment contracts are for the same number of hours. However, workers have different reservation wages. Employment consists of labor employed in manufacturing and agriculture (the covered and uncovered sectors respectively):
Using a "hat" to denote a proportional change, differentiating (2)
Denoting the elasticities of demand for labor in the two sectors as
and
A c is the number of workers who apply for jobs when all sectors pay the covered wage, and ε is the elasticity of supply of labor. 
A u is the number of workers who apply for jobs when all sectors pay the uncovered wage.
Thus,
Manufacturing jobs are allocated by lottery, and a fraction π of all jobs seekers achieve their preferred employment (in manufacturing). Thus, the residual supply of labor to agriculture is
π is the ratio of manufacturing jobs to those who apply for them, which we define as A c :
In agriculture the labor market clears, so
We assume that our economy starts with the minimum wage equal to the covered wage, so the labor market clears:
Logarithmically differentiate (8). Substitute (7), (10), and the logarithmic differential of (9) into the result to eliminate u u S , A and π . This yields
Substitute (4), (5) and (6) into (12) and then (9) and (11) into the result to eliminate π :
3 In the limit as the minimum manufacturing wage approaches the agricultural wage from above A c approaches A u , but as the manufacturing wage rises further, depressing the agricultural wage, A c rises while A u falls. We use (9) in its differential form, necessitating placing A c rather than A u in the denominator.
The intuition behind (13) is that a slightly binding or "small" minimum wage reduces employment in the covered sector. It also draws new workers into the labor market, attracted by the higher wage. Thus it shifts employment in the covered sector from low reservation-wage workers to high reservation-wage workers. This shifts the supply of workers to the uncovered sector to the right and thereby depresses the uncovered wage.
Combining (3), (4), (5) and (13) yields
Equation (14) gives us: Only in that circumstance will the new jobs created by a lower wage in the uncovered sector exceed those lost by the higher wage in the covered sector. Equation (14) is elegantly simple and we believe it has not previously appeared in the literature. 4 Brown, Gilroy and Kohen [1982, p.491, left column] build a model using the same mechanism we use. They derive a formula for the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage, assuming the elasticity of demand for labor is the same in both sectors. For a slightly binding minimum wage (in their notation, W m is close to W u ), they find the elasticity is zero as we do. For a finite increase in the minimum wage, however, they find employment falls. But their equations are valid only for a slightly binding minimum wage, i.e., they are first order approximations. To make them (and the analyses of Welch 1974 and 
HOW THE MINIMUM WAGE AFFECTS EFFICIENCY
We define the change in aggregate utility, dW, as the equivalent variation in income, and we remember that the initial wages in the two sectors are equal. Tax revenue is redistributed to the population as a lump-sum subsidy. Consequently, the change in the aggregate welfare is the sum of the change in the outputs weighted by consumer prices, pdX, minus the loss in leisure multiplied by the valuation of a unit of leisure, cdE:
where X and p are the vectors of outputs and consumer prices.
A tax is levied as a proportion, t, of disposable labor income. Since labor is paid its marginal product:
Combining (15) and (16) yields
Equation (17) gives us:
Proposition 2: If wages are taxed at a uniform ad valorem rate, imposition of a slightly binding minimum wage raises economic efficiency if and only if it raises employment.
The rationale is that such a minimum wage hike draws labor into work, where it is taxed, away from untaxed leisure. Equation (17) is quite simple. Part of the simplicity arises from the fact that the costs generally associated with the minimum wage are triangles. These are second order effects that can be disregarded when the minimum wage is barely binding. When the minimum wage is barely binding and there is no tax, the values of the marginal products of labor, VMPLs, in the two sectors are the same and the reservation wage of all those who move between leisure and work is the same as the common VMPL. This results in a zero marginal efficiency cost of raising the minimum wage. As the minimum wage rises, increasingly high-reservation-wage labor is enticed into the labor market, replacing low-reservation-wage labor, and labor is increasingly thrown from the high VMPL covered sector into the low VMPL uncovered sector. These effects constitute GT's efficiency cost of the minimum wage.
So far we have been concerned only with barely binding minimum wages, which permits us to conclude that efficiency moves in the same direction as employment. When the wage differential is finite, increasing employment becomes a necessary but not sufficient condition for a minimum-wage hike to increase efficiency.
Combining (14) and (17) yields
, , , , ,
σ and Ki θ are respectively sector i's stock of the fixed factor, labor employed, wage rate, rental rate, elasticity of substitution in production and the share of the fixed factor in output.
Thus, we can rewrite (18) It is tempting to try to go further and calculate the optimum minimum wage. The difficulty is that our problem is to find a second best optimum, and only first best optima have neat analytical solutions. For a second best optimum one needs to resort to a simulation model like that of Grimes and Tower (1998) .
HOW THE MINIMUM WAGE AFFECTS TAX REVENUE
Adopting a slightly binding minimum wage, raises the wage in the minimum wage sector but drops it in the free sector, so we expected its effect on total labor earnings and tax revenue in the presence of a constant ad valorem tax on labor earnings to be a complex expression. Now we derive it. We define R as tax revenue, which is
Differentiating (21), while holding the tax rate constant, then substituting from (4), (5), (13) and (2) into the result, while remembering that initially c and u are equal yields another elegantly simple equation:
Comparing (22) with (14) and (18) shows that the proportional change in tax revenue (which equals that for the aggregate wage bill) has the same sign as the change in employment (and efficiency). Intuitively it makes sense that tax revenue rises by more, the more elastic the supply of labor, the less elastic the demand for labor in the covered sector, and the more elastic the demand for labor in the free sector. Hence: 
DO OUR EQUATIONS MAKE SENSE?
Intuitively, it is obvious that the gain in employment, efficiency, the wage bill and tax revenue is larger, the lower the labor demand elasticity is in the covered sector (for fewer workers are displaced) and the higher the labor demand elasticity in the free sector (because the less the free wage has to decline in order to absorb the displaced workers).
Employment and efficiency also rise by more the higher the labor supply elasticity is (because more workers are attracted into work by the minimum wage). But why is it that employment, efficiency and the wage bill are all unchanged when the two labor demand elasticities are identical?
To see this intuitively, let's make our mental gymnastics more graceful by assuming equal initial employment in the two sectors. Establishing the slightly-binding minimum wage means that half of applicants for the preferred jobs will be successful.
Therefore, at the initial free wage the number of workers that are newly attracted into the labor force is ĉεE/2 = ĉεU. They will take jobs from the previously employed. The number of jobs in the covered sector are killed by the minimum wage is ĉη c C = ĉη c U .
This means that at the initial free wage, there is now an excess supply of workers who have not found covered sector jobs of ĉ[η c+ ε]U. The number of workers who find jobs in the free sector or pull out of the labor force as the free wage falls is -û[η u+ ε]U.
Labor market equilibrium in the uncovered sector dictates that the two expressions be equal. Thus, when η c = η u, û = -ĉ, i.e. the free wage falls by just as much as the covered wage rose. Since the labor demand elasticities are the same, the number of jobs destroyed in the covered sector equals the number of jobs created in the free sector, with no change in employment or efficiency. Since the average wage hasn't changed, the wage bill is unchanged and so is tax revenue.
THE WELFARE-REVENUE TRADEOFF WHEN LABOR IS UNIFORMLY TAXED
Now that we have learned how a slightly binding minimum wage affects efficiency in the presence of a tax, let's see what we can say about the optimum mix of the tax and the minimum wage. In the next two sections, we assume that tax revenue is distributed to a select group of the population, which is particularly worthy or has powerful political clout, so the policy maker cares about total tax revenue. We also assume that opposition political parties harp on low employment levels and a low standard of living.
Consequently, our policy maker seeks three objectives: employment, efficiency and tax revenue. that a single ad valorem tax rate is applied to both sectors and there is no minimum wage.
As the tax rate rises from zero at A to the prohibitive level at O, welfare monotonically declines, and revenue is shown to rise and then fall, although the function need not be single peaked.
How will a minimum wage affect the tradeoff? We know from (17) that holding the tax rate constant, if and only if a small minimum wage raises employment will it raise welfare as well. That is also the condition for output and revenue to rise. Thus, holding the tax rate constant, a small minimum wage shifts each point on the frontier to the northeast or southwest, depending on whether it causes employment to rise or fall.
Assume, holding the tax rate constant, a small minimum wage raises employment. where S lies far to the right of j, meaning there is a very large supply of labor with a reservation wage of 0.6 pesos/day. With no tax or minimum wage, the wage is 0.5 pesos/day, employment is 1.9 thousand workers, and output is valued at the area, 0acmnr = 1.45 thousand pesos/day. This also measures welfare, since the labor hired has a reservation wage of zero.
Figures 2 and 3 go about here.
We can impose a specific tax of close to 0.5 pesos/worker-day without efficiency suffering. This is equivalent to an ad valorem tax of almost 100%. That brings in almost 0.95 thousand pesos/day of tax revenue. RH is a rectangular hyperbola, which intersects the demand function to the right of n. This means that revenue at c exceeds revenue at n.
Consequently, when the tax rate rises almost to 1 peso/worker-day, equilibrium jumps almost to c, with revenue jumping to almost the striped area, R, 1 thousand pesos/day, and efficiency dropping by the shaded area, E, to 1 thousand pesos/day. This is illustrated by the Free Market Frontier in Figure 3 . Note, in this example there is no payoff from imposing different tax rates in different sectors. Figure 4 illustrates what happens when we impose a minimum wage in manufacturing that lies above S and is given by eM = 0.7 pesos/day. Manufacturing employment and wage is given by f, with manufacturing output given by area Oabp. Almost all workers in manufacturing are drawn from the enormous labor pool of workers with a reservation wage of 0.6. Consequently, the supply of labor to agriculture is OrjS, and agricultural equilibrium is at n, with agricultural output valued at Oabznr. In the process, the value of aggregate output has expanded by pzmq, which is identical to Okzp. But this process causes high-reservation wage labor to be absorbed into manufacturing. This labor has sacrificed leisure it values at Oghp in order to work in minimum-wage manufacturing.
Consequently, the minimum wage has caused an efficiency loss of the shaded area, kghz,
denoted by E and valued at 0.05 thousand pesos/day, reducing efficiency to 1.4 thousand pesos/day as indicated by the top of the curve labeled High Minimum Wage Frontier in Figure 3 .
Figure 4 goes about here.
Once the minimum wage is established, a tax per worker-day can be imposed in manufacturing of up to ga (with workers paying no more per worker-day than ge and employers paying no more than ea) and in agriculture of up to Ok, without changing employments or outputs or causing efficiency to shrink further. This raises revenue up to the limit indicated in Figure 4 as the sum of the two striped areas, R m and R a , gabh + Oknr, 0.4*0.5 + 0.5*1.9 = 1.15 thousand pesos/day. All this is indicated by Figure 4 's High Minimum Wage Frontier.
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Assuming the policy maker's indifference curves for welfare and revenue are given by the U's in Figure 3 , we see that utility rises from U F , which grazes FMF at f, to U M , which grazes HMWF at m. As Figure 3 indicates both revenue and welfare rise.
Employment rises as well. This leads us to 
INTUITIVE SUMMARY
We have considered an economy (e.g., Chile 1973-83 or modern Turkey) with a minimum wage sector, a free sector and a tax on all labor earnings. We asked "Can a slightly binding minimum wage simultaneously raise tax revenue, employment, and economic efficiency? We discover this happens if and only if the elasticity of demand in the free sector exceeds the elasticity of demand in the minimum-wage sector.
Here is the key to the paradox. The minimum wage attracts high-reservation wage workers into the minimum-wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. The displacement of workers by the only slightly-binding minimum wage has negligible effects on the utility of the labor 5 We label this the High Minimum Wage Frontier be cause the Minimum Wage Envelope is the envelope of which comes to be employed or is displaced by the minimum wage, because the new minimum wage is close to both the wage in the free sector and the reservation price that these workers put on leisure. But work is taxed and leisure is not, so the value of the marginal product of the new workers exceeds the value to them of leisure lost by the size of the tax. Consequently, the value of the basket of goods and leisure produced in the economy rises by the amount of the tax times the net new employment as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work. This means that employment rises, efficiency rises as well, and since labor is taxed uniformly in both sectors, tax revenue rises as well.
We find that a policy maker who values employment, efficiency and tax revenue may be able to achieve more utility with a combination of taxes on employment and a minimum wage in one sector than can be achieved with taxes on employment alone.
Moreover, the minimum-wage equilibrium may be characterized by higher levels of all three objectives than the no-minimum wage equilibrium. These conclusions hold broadly. Specifically, they hold when the ad valorem wage tax (a) is predetermined and the same in both sectors, (b) may be optimized but is constrained to be the same in both sectors, or (c) may be optimized indendently in each sector.
The general theory of the second best tells us that introducing a distortion into an already distorted economy may raise economic efficiency. This paper presents yet another application of that proposition. here also applies to more developed economies. The idea that a hike in the minimum wage may raise employment has recently been emphasized by Ahn and Arcidiacono (2004) , and Krueger (1994 and 1995, p.38) , although refuted empirically by Neumark and Wascher (2000) . The issue remains controversial. For example:
PERSPECTIVE
James Buchanan, the 1986 laureate for his work on public choice, said it best: "The inverse relationship between quantity demanded and price is the core proposition in economic science." To assert that raising the minimum wage would actually increase employment, he continued, "becomes equivalent to a denial that there is even minimal scientific content in economics." Merton Miller, a 1990 laureate for work on capital markets asks of the notion that a minimum wage boost is costless, "Is all this too good to be true? Damn right. But it sure plays well in the opinion polls. I tremble for my profession."
Review and Outlook," Wall Street Journal, April 29, 1996, p. A22).
Are the results of this paper too good to be true? A colleague thought so, telling us "The results are so crazy that the mathematics must be wrong."
We have no reason to believe that the elasticity of demand for labor in the free sector is likely to be greater than the demand elasticity in the covered sector. Consequently, we are skeptical that this mechanism is important in practice. 6 Minimum wages are likely to be promoted by populist politicians, who goose them up beyond efficiency maximizing levels. They discriminate against the unskilled. They introduce inflexibility into economies faced with adverse monetary and real shocks. They may be set with an eye to the short run when labor demand elasticities and the distorting effects of minimum wages are smaller than in the long run. Consequently, we do not advocate minimum wages.
Still, we think that the mechanisms we have explored are important, and believe that it is worthwhile to explore the realms of possibilities that the standard tools of economics yield up. Perhaps, the reader should think of our results as akin to the Giffen or Metzler paradoxes.
There is another implication of our analysis that merits discussion. In our model with no taxes, the marginal welfare cost of a hike in the minimum wage is positive only when the initial minimum wage is binding and already distorting the labor market, just as is the case for a tariff imposed by a small country. The introduction of a wage tax means that the marginal welfare cost of a hike in an initially binding minimum wage may be either positive or negative. Thus, introduction of the tax expands the power of a minimum wage for good or evil. If the policy maker imposes the minimum wage on the sector with the higher labor demand elasticity, labor taxes make the cost greater than we would have otherwise calculated.
Moreover, there is a presumption that minimum wages will shrink employment, and this will be costlier when taxes mean that labor is already being squeezed out of taxed employment into untaxed leisure. Thus, one of the morals of the paper is that future researchers who perform cost-benefit analysis of minimum wages could reckon with how they interact with tax distortions, both those that explicitly tax employment, and those that implicitly do so, like sales taxes and value-added taxes. Edgeworth (1908) in reviewing Bickerdike's analysis of the optimum tariff, expressed the fear that it would provide fodder for unscrupulous protectionists, and admonished "Let us admire the skill of the analyst, but label the product of his analysis POISON." Perhaps this evaluation applies to the current paper.
